State of Utah v. Brady C. Bullock : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
State of Utah v. Brady C. Bullock : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger Blaylock; Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; Attorney for Respondent.
Loni F. Deland; McRae and DeLand; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Bullock, No. 870332 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/540
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
7A' 
J '"*" £ H 
£0 
.A10 
DOCKET NO .330332=. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint iff/Respondent, 
v. 
BRADY C. BULLOCK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case Ncj. 870332-CA 
2-
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
LONI F. Deli AND 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Appellant 
Roger Blaylock 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State, Room S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
JAJV1 •'* ^0 
Qfti 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint iff/Respondent, 
v. 
BRADY C. BULLOCK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case Nq. 870332-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
LONI F . DelpAND 
McRAE & DetAND 
132 South koo East 
Salt Lake fcity, Utah 84102 
Telephone:! (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Appellant 
Roger Blaylock 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State, Room S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES , 1 
JURISDICTION I 3 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS I 3 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES j 3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. , 
7 
13 
ARGUMENT 'J, 14 
1. THE TAINT ATTACHED AT THE MOMENT THE DEPUTIES 
ENTERED ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY. 14 
2. THE QUESTIONING OF APPELLANT WAS NOT BASED 
UPON REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THE EVIDENCE 
DERIVED THEREFROM IS TAINTED . . . 16 
3. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSEJ TO ARREST. . . . 17 
j 
4. THE "ADMISSIONS" AND FIELD TEST RESUIiTS WERE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED j 21 
5. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING THE!MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS AND/OR DISMISS I 23 
6. SECTION 41-6-44(8) OF THE UTAH CODE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE OR AS APPLIED 23 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Boyd v. U.S. , 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
 r 23 
21 
15 
Boyd, State v., 692 P.2d 769 (Utah 1984). 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543. . 
Cole, State v., 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983). . 1 19 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) 20, 23 
Cruz, State v. , 446 P.2d 307 (Utah 1968). 21 
Hamilton, State v. , 710 P.2d 174 (Utah, 1985^ 15, 22 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948J 19 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 15 
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319|(1979). . . . . . 10 
Mendoza, et al., State v., P.2d (Ut^h, 
December 13, 1987) 20 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . 22 
Olesen v. Pincock, 68 U. 507 (1986) . . . J 19 
Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) 27 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) 18 
Swanigan, State v. , 699 P.2d 718 (1985) . J 17 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1 63) 
16 
14 
Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). . L 18 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I, §12 3, 4 
Article I, §14 4 
Constitution of the United States 
Amendment Four 23 
Amendment Five 2.1, 22, 23 
§41-6-44, U.C.A 7 
§41-6-44(l)(a) , U.C.A 5 
§41-6-44(8), U.C.A 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29 
§41-6-44.10(2)(a) , U.C.A 21 
§76-6-801, et seq 26 
§77-7-1, U.C.A 5 
§77-7-2, U.C.A 15, 18, 23, 24, 25, 28 
§77-7-3, U.C.A 21 
§77-7-12-14, U.C.A 26 
§77-7-15, U.C.A 14, 16 
§77-7-16, U.C.A 16 
§77-9-1, et seq 15 
§77-35-26, U.C.A 7 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 3 3 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 4 3 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to the 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12; Utah Code 1987-1988, 
Sections 77-35-26(13) and 77-l-6(g); and Rules 3 and 4, Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, this being an appeal from the final 
orders of a Circuit Court, including the judgment of conviction 
in a criminal case and, in addition, where the constitutionality 
of a statute is at issue. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the final orders and judgments 
of the Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake 
County, Utah to wit: 
a, A judgment of conviction of Driving Under the 
Influence in violation of Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 
1985, as amended, a class "B" misdemeanor; 
b. Denial of Defendant/Appellant's pre-trial Motion(s) 
to Dismiss/Suppress evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUER 
1. Is Section 41-6-44(8), Utah Code Annotated, uncon-
stitutional on its face and/or as applied herein? 
2. Was the trial court's denial pf Appellantfs 
pre-trial motions to dismiss and/or suppresp evidence on consti-
tutional grounds an abuse of discretion which deprived Appellant 
of constitutionally protected rights? 
3. Did the trial court apply the appropriate burden of 
proof in denial of Appellant's said pre-trial motions? 
4. Was the evidence against Appellant admitted at 
trial the product of unconstitutional search, seizure and/or 
prohibition against involuntary self-incriminating statements and 
thereby tainted so as to deny Appellant the due process of law at 
trial? 
5. Was the said evidence derived from an unlawful 
arrest and therefore rendering the trial court's jurisdiction 
over Appellant unconstitutionally void afc> initio? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Constitution of Utah 
Article I 
Section 12, [Rights of Accused Persons,] 
. . . The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; . . . 
Section 14. [Unreasonable Searches Forbidden - Issuance of 
Warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; . . . 
2. Constitution of the United States 
Amendment Four 
. . . The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; . . . 
Amendment Five 
No person . . • shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of l&w, . . . 
3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; (Also, Utah Code, 
1987-1988). 
Section 41-6-44(1)(a) 
It is unlawful . . . for any persoh to 
operate . . . a vehicle . . . if the person 
is under the influence of alcohol |. . . to a 
degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle. 
Section 41-6-44(8) 
A peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person for a violation of this 
section when the officer has probable cause 
to believe the violation has occurred, 
although not in his presence, and if the 
officer has probable cause to believe that 
the violation was committed by the person. 
Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) 
If the person has been placed under arrest 
and has then been requested by a peace 
officer to submit . . . chemical tests . . . 
Section 77-7-1. "Arrest" defined - Restraint 
allowed. 
An arrest is an actual restraint of the 
person arrested or submission to cjustody. 
The person shall not be subjected to any more 
restraint than is necessary for hi|s arrest 
and detention. 
Section 77-7-2. By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of a warrant or may, witjhout 
warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or 
attempted in the presence of any peace 
officer; "presence" includes all of the 
physical senses or any device that enhances 
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any 
physical sense, or records the observations 
of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed and has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid 
arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage 
property belonging to another person. 
Section 11-1-3. By private persons, 
A private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense committed or 
attempted in his presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and 
he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
arrested has committed it. 
Section 77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to 
stop and question suspect - Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a convictioh for the class lfB" 
misdemeanor criminal offense of Driving Undeir the Influence (of 
Alcohol) in violation of the Utah Codef Sectlion 41-6-44, (DUI.) 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant was arrested for DUI on bctober 4, 1986, in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, by Salt Lake County ^eputy Sheriff E. 
Robbie Russo and thereafter charged by formal Information with 
said charge before the Honorable Joanne Rigby, Justice of the 
Peace, 6th Precinct Court, Salt Lake County. (Case No. 
1759104A). 
A judgment of conviction and sentejnce were entered in 
said Precinct Court on December 10, 1986, for the lesser offense 
of "Reckless Driving" pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement and 
plea. 
Appellant hired present counsel anld raised the issue of 
the constitutionality of his arrest and subsequent prosecution 
with said court and therein timely filed his Notice of Appeal 
(January 7, 1987) pursuant to 77-35-26, U.C.iA., requesting a de 
novo trial in the Fifth Circuit Court. 
Appellant was arraigned in the Circuit Court on January 
29, 1987. 
Appellant filed a pre-trial Motion to Dismiss/Suppress 
(see infra) on or about March 19, 1987, whidh was taken under 
advisement by Judge Gibson who, on April 15, 1987 denied Appel-
lant's Motion(s) without the benefit of Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law, oral or written. 
Trial by jury was held on June 15, 1987. Appellant 
again raised substance of motions before the first witness was 
sworn which was summarily denied by Judge Gibson. 
The state called five witnesses: two civilians who 
witnessed Appellant operating a vehicle in a manner they per-
ceived as unsafe due to alcohol impairment; Deputy Russo and his 
on-scene "back-up" officer; and the breath-test machine techni-
cian. The state rested following admission of breath test 
results over objection of Appellant. 
Appellant moved to dismiss on those grounds set forth 
hereinafter after having unsuccessfully objected during ex-
amination to admission of testimony and evidence which is herein-
after raised on appeal. Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was 
denied. Appellant rested. 
The case was argued and submitted to the jury which 
later returned with a verdict of guilty. 
C. DISPOSITION 
Following the June 15, 1987 jury verdict, sentence was 
imposed and final judgment of conviction entered by Judge Gibson 
on August 28, 1987. 
D. RELEVANT FACTS 
Since the issues on appeal relate solely to the unlaw-
ful actions of the police officer in confronting, detaining, 
questioning and arresting Appellant, it woul$ be helpful to 
present this Court with a summary of the general facts giving 
rise to Appellant's arrest, the facts known to the officer prior 
to questioning and then prior to the eventual arrest. A summary 
of additional facts adduced at trial, although not material to 
the issues on appeal, are presented for clarity. 
1. Generally 
About 11:00 p.m., October 4, 1986, in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Mr. and Mrs. Roger and Susan Mott were proceeding eastbound 
on 4500 South (Susan driving) when a pick-up truck driven by 
Appellant turned in front of them in pulling into a 7-11 Store 
parking lot, nearly causing a collision. (Tj:., 49.) 
The Mott vehicle followed. Mr. Mott angrily confronted 
Appellant, berating him for his driving actions and demanding to 
know if he (Appellant) was drunk. (Tr., 61.^Receiving no 
response, Mr. Mott informed Appellant that hk was going to call 
the police. (Tr., 61.) 
Mr. Mott then entered the 7-11 and requested a sales 
clerk notify the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office of the inci-
dent. The sales clerk called the sheriff's dispatcher and 
apparently provided the truck's license number and presumably 
reported the driver as a suspected "drunk driver". (The record 
is silent as to what facts Mr. Mott provided to the clerk and as 
to what the clerk told the sheriff's dispatcher.) (Tr., 63.) 
Simultaneous with Mr. Mott's entering the 7-11, Appel-
lant departed the parking lot and drove into a nearby residential 
area. The Motts then conducted a search of the area and located 
the suspect vehicle parked in front of a private residence about 
three blocks away. (Tr., 53.) The residence was also the 
address listed for the vehicle's registered owner, Mr. Brian 
Scoffield. (Tr., 88.) 
The Motts then returned home, took care of some family 
matters and Mr. Mott made a call of his own to the sheriff's 
office, adding only that the suspect vehicle was located at the 
Scoffield address. The Motts then drove to the said address, 
arriving after the deputies. (Tr., 53, 54, 56, 84.) The amount 
of time which passed from the driving incident and the 
confrontation between Appellant and the deputies was somewhere 
between 30 minutes (Tr., 54, testimony of Mrs. Mott) and 50 
minutes (Tr., 91, Deputy Russo). 
2. Pre-Questioning/Detention Facts Known to Deputy 
Russo 
Upon arrival at the Scoffield residence Deputy Russo 
had only been advised by the sheriff's dispatcher that a "possi-
ble drunk driver" complaint had been called in and the vehicle 
description and location of same. (Tr., 85, 86, 103, 104). 
He was relying entirely upon a hearsay report of an 
unknown civilian complainant and had no information of any facts 
giving rise to the complaint. (Tr.f 85f 86, 103.) 
Upon arrival at the Scoffield residence, Russo and 
other deputies entered onto the private property without asking 
for or receiving any consent to do so. (Tr.;, 87-89.) Mr. 
Scoffield, Appellant and another man were standing in the 
driveway next to the home. Russo first approached Mr. Scoffield, 
identified him and asked him if he had earlier been driving the 
truck. He said that he had. (Tr., 88, 89.) While Russo 
continued questioning Scoffield, the Motts arrived and Mr. Mott 
came onto the private property and advised Russo that Scoffield 
was not the suspect and pointed out Appellant who was standing 
some 40 to 50 feet further up the driveway. (Tr., 66.) 
Mott also apprised Russo of the ne&r-collision driving 
pattern of Appellant but provided no further facts. (Tr., 105.) 
Russo then approached Appellant and asked for identi-
fication to ascertain his name and address. Appellant complied. 
(Tr., 90.) Russo then asked if Appellant ha<^  earlier driven the 
vehicle and if he had been drinking. Appellant said he had drunk 
three beers and had driven the suspect vehicle. (Tr., 92.) 
However, the record is silent as to when Appellant had driven the 
truck, whether or not he had drank after he cprove or when prior 
to driving he had drank. 
Russo also noticed a "moderate" odor of alcohol on 
Appellant. (Tr., 90.) 
Based therefore on the hearsay of a private citizen as 
to the element of driving (and negligent driving pattern) and 
upon the triple hearsay report of a "possible drunk driver" (from 
citizen to 7-11 clerk to dispatcher to Russo) and upon the odor 
of alcohol (30 to 50 minutes later) and upon Appellant's admis-
sion to drinking at some unknown earlier time and driving at some 
unspecified time, Russo asked Appellant to "submit" to field 
sobriety tests. Appellant submitted. (Tr., 92.) 
Russo then removed Appellant to another location and 
had him perform four agility tests which were indicative of 
impairment, per Russo's opinion. (Tr., 98, 106.) 
Russo admitted that he never informed Appellant that 
Appellant was under no obligation to attempt the field tests 
(even though Russo knew that) and Russo further admitted that he 
requested the tests in order to gather evidence of Appellant's 
impairment. (Tr., 115, 116.) 
Further, Russo testified that he did not advise Appel-
lant of his Miranda rights until after his arrest. (Tr., 115.) 
He arrested Appellant immediately following the field 
tests. (Tr., 98.) Some 20 minutes later (and some 50 to 70 
minutes following the reported act of driving) Appellant was 
given a breath test resulting in a blood-alcohol reading of .11%. 
3. Additional Facts 
Although Mr, and Mrs. Mott testified at trial to such 
observations as Appellant's intoxicated appearance, unresponsive 
demeanor, further egregious driving pattern lipon departing the 
7-11, odor of alcohol and empty beer and whi$key containers in 
the truck bed, those "facts" are not relevant since none were 
known to Russo until after the arrest and, ih fact, not until 
trial for the most part. (Tr., 105, 106.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant will argue that his prosecution and attendant 
conviction herein were void ajD initio due to his arrest being 
based upon unlawfully obtained evidence in violation of his 
rights to be protected from unconstitutional intrusions by police 
officers as to search and seizure and the obtaining of statements 
and testimonial evidence of an incriminating nature without 
benefit of Miranda warnings. 
Appellant also argues that the arrest was based upon 
insufficient probable cause irrespective of the admissibility of 
the evidence and that the court should have therefore dismissed 
the charge on jurisdictional and due process grounds prior to 
trial and/or prior to submission to the jury. 
Appellant not only argues that the admission of the 
evidence over his motions and objections denied him due process 
but further argues that the statutes pertaining to his detention 
were violated and that the statute which purports to allow for 
DUI arrests absent the "presence" requirement of the arresting 
officer is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this 
instance. 
ARGUMENT 
Since a trial court cannot obtain jurisdiction derived 
from an illegal arrest and cannot permit evidence to be admitted 
which is tainted by the prior unlawful search, seizure or ques-
tioning of a suspect, this case should be analyzed to determine 
whether any or all of the evidence against Appellant was the 
fruit of a "poisoned tree" and, if so, at what point the taint 
attached. It is at the point that all after acquired evidence 
should have been excluded. 
Evidence gained during an illegal arrest is inadmissi-
ble. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). All 
evidence obtained following the unlawful invasion of rights is 
also inadmissible. 
1. THE TAINT ATTACHED AT THE MOMENT THE 
DEPUTIES ENTERED ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
A lengthy discussion of Fourth Amendment rights is not 
necessary. Utah law does not permit an officer to confront a 
person for questioning except in a public place. (See argument 
re: 77-7-15, infra.) 
The only perceivable exceptions to the absolute re-
quirement of a warrant before entering private property are: 
consent, hot pursuit and probable cause coupled with exigent 
circumstances. 
a. Consent, The record shows that consent was neither 
requested nor given. The officers1 entry was merely acquiesced 
to. Consent must be voluntary and informed. Mere submission to 
authority is insufficient. It is the prosecutor's burden to 
prove waiver. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543. Absent 
proof, there is a presumption against waiver of a constitutional 
rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458. 
b. Hot Pursuit. This exception requires what it 
implies, pursuit by an officer of a fleeing violator justifying a 
continuing and unbroken action allowing the officer to follow the 
offender onto private property. Utah law clearly rejects this 
exception. 77-7-2, U.C.A.; State v. Hamiltoh, 710 P.2d 174 
(Utah, 1985); 77-9-1, et £e£., U.C.A. 
c. Exigent Circumstances. The di$cussion below sets 
out the exigent circumstance element of this two-prong test. 
None are present. Further, the second prong is the pre-existence 
of probable cause. Under no circumstance can it be argued that 
probable cause preceded the entry. (See provable cause argument, 
infra.) 
Since no exception to the warrant requirement is 
present, the entry onto private property to Search and question 
is the original taint and all subsequent evidence is inadmissi-
ble. The arrest is also unlawful and the cage should be dis-
missed. 
2. THE QUESTIONING OF APPELLANT WAS NOT BASED 
UPON REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THE 
EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM IS TAINTED 
Assuming arguendo that the entry onto the private 
property was lawful, then the next level of intrusion is the 
point of taint. 
At 77-7-15 and 16, U.C.A., is found the codification of 
the "stop and frisk" holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Simply put, 77-7-15 forbids an officer from even 
questioning a person unless: 
a. He is in a public place, and 
b. The officer can articulate specific facts which 
demonstrate "reasonable suspicion" that the suspect has committed 
or is committing a crime. 
Even where the stop is lawful due to pre-existing 
reasonable suspicion, the officer may only ask for "name, address 
and explanation of actions". 
The Terry test falls grossly short for several reasons: 
a. No public place. 
b. Those facts articulated by this officer do not rise 
to the level of "reasonable suspicion," therefore jrio Questions 
were permissible. The suspicion was based upon a dispatcher's 
triple hearsay report of a "possible drunk driver," the statement 
of a private citizen-informant of unknown credibility that 
Appellant drove erratically, the odor of alcohol 30 to 50 minutes 
after the fact and certain vague "admissions" by Appellant of 
driving at an earlier time. 
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction where a jTerry-stop was based 
on "mere" suspicion or "hunch" rather than "reasonable suspi-
cion". The suspicion in that case was based upon a description 
of the suspect provided by a fellow officer who had not person-
ally observed the criminal activity, but saw the suspects walking 
near the scene of recent burglaries at a late hour. 
c. Even if Russo's then-known facts permitted a 
Terry-stop, his questions exceeded the permissible statutory 
scope in that the only ones asked were directed at the two 
elements of the crime, i.e., "were you drinking. Were you 
driving." The probe continued into the demahd for performance of 
agility tests, hardly "an explanation of his actions". 
The stop/questioning therefore was unlawful and all 
evidence thereafter derived should have been suppressed. 
3. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE C^USE TO ARREST 
Even if this Court finds that Russo had "reasonable 
suspicion" to question Appellant, it is cleaif that the additional 
facts obtained prior to the arrest were not $ufficient to estab-
lish probable cause, i.e., odor of alcohol and results of agility 
test. (Appellant also argues, infra, that tfc(e agility test 
results are further tainted per Miranda, int^r alia.) 
The Utah Code, at 77-7-2 states, in pertinent part, 
that a peace officer may not arrest for a misdemeanor unless the 
offense is committed in his presence UNLESS he has probable cause 
to believe it was committed and exigent circumstances necessitate 
the arrest (to prevent flight, destruction of evidence, etc.) 
The 1985 Utah State Legislature carried out one addi-
tional exception to 77-7-2 which is unique to no other offense 
other than DUI. By enacting 41-6-44(8), the code was amended to 
permit a warrantless arrest (for DUI only) even though the 
"presence" prong is absent but only where the officer has "proba-
ble cause". 
Since only two elements of the instant offense are at 
issue, an examination of the facts giving rise to the probable 
cause for arrest and the nexus between the two is necessary. 
41-6-44(8) clearly states that probable cause must 
exist both as to the element of impairment of the driver ("of-
fense was committed") and to the actual driving at the time of 
the impairment by the accused, ("committed by that person") the 
underlying facts must still meet the due process test. The facts 
known to the officer at the time of arrest must be such that a 
detached magistrate upon the same facts would have issued a 
warrant. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Whitely 
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
The entire foundation for the driving pattern comes 
from an unknown informant who said nothing to the officer to 
create a nexus with the element of impairment. Spinelli requires 
knowledge of the informant's credibility. At best, an angry and 
biased informant reported a traffic violation possibly rising to 
reckless driving (which requires "presence" of the officer.) 
As to the element of impairment, the officer relied 
solely upon the odor of alcohol and field tejsts perceived much 
later. Those facts, even with Appellant's admitted drinking, 
only show "drinking" or "drinking and driving", neither of which 
are crimes, no connection being made. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found an arrest to be 
invalid even where the officer himself observed the driving 
before locating and arresting the suspect at home. Olesen v. 
Pincock, 68 U. 507 (1926). 
The reason for the constraint is clear. When the 
suspected crime is no longer ongoing, the impartial judicial 
review of the facts outweighs the public safety concerns set out 
in the exigent circumstances subsection. 
Probable cause to arrest is restricted to facts then 
known and reasonable inferences to be drawn ttherefrom based upon 
an objective standard. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah, 1983). 
The reason for a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, is to 
guard against violations of rights by a neutral and detached 
magistrate. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.,S. 10 (1948). The 
United States Supreme Court has invalidated cjonvictions where 
even warrants were issued by non-neutral magistrates or attorneys 
general. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Lo-Ji 
Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). 
This arrest/seizure was based upon the hearsay of an 
angry and biased witness as to one element and speculation (not 
inference) as to the nexus of belated subjective perceptions as 
to the other. Query: Would a reasonable judge issue a warrant 
based upon the facts known to Russo at the time? 
Olesen, supra, holds a warrant is required due to the 
time passage even if the officer observed the offense hours 
earlier. If the 41-6-44(8) exception to presence is not limited 
by time constraints, then an officer can make v/arrantless arrests 
for days or months following an offense. He therefore becomes 
both enforcer and magistrate. 
Worse, in relying upon the complaint of a citizen to 
formulate probable cause as to at least element, the citizen 
becomes the "magistrate" authorizing an officer to make an 
arrest. 
Nevertheless, there was no probable cause to support an 
arrest. In its recent holding in State v. Mendoza, et al., 
P.2d (Utah, December 13, 1987), the Supreme Court found 
probable cause insufficient where the officers observed then 
stopped two Hispanics with out of state plates (fitting the "drug 
courier profile" in several respects) driving a vehicle in an 
erratic and suspicious manner. Subsequent questioning revealed 
suspicious behavior. A "consent" search produced a quantity of 
narcotics. 
In reversing Mendoza the court set! a standard for 
probable cause greatly exceeding the articullable facts present in 
this case. 
One option which would have remove^ the hear-
say/credibility issue from the probable causfe determination would 
have been to allow Mr. Mott to make a citizen's arrest pursuant 
to 77-7-3. 
However, since the officer chose tt> make a warrantless 
arrest on these facts, the court must conclude that the arrest 
herein was unlawful thereby depriving the trJLal court of juris-
diction. 
At the least, if this Court finds probable cause to be 
lacking, the breath test results must be excluded since the law 
in this matter mandates that breath tests ma^ only be adminis-
tered pursuant to a lawful arrest. 41-6-44.X0(2)(a); State v. 
Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah, 1968). Where only driving pattern 
testimony and admissions of drinking coupled with after-acquired 
"evidence" is admissible, the evidence is insufficient to support 
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt State v. Boyd, 692 
P.2d 769 (Utah, 1984). 
4. THE "ADMISSIONS" AND FIELri TEST 
RESULTS WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY QBTAINED 
Even if the pre-arrest facts are fqund sufficient to 
form probable cause, certain of them must be excluded on Fifth 
Amendment grounds. 
In short, once a suspect is subjected to custodial 
questioning, his responses are not admissible unless a Miranda 
warning has been given. 
Custody is determined by that moment, after which, the 
suspect is no longer free to leave. Any interference with the 
suspect's intended freedom of movement is a detention, whether or 
not the officer actually restrains him or announces an arrest and 
even if the officer does not believe he has arrested the suspect 
for Miranda purposes. At that point the answers are inadmissible 
if prompted by the officer's questions, rather than impromptu. 
State v. Hamilton, 710 P.2d 174 (Utah 1985); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966); 77-7-6, U.C.A. 
Two levels of potential Fifth Amendment violations 
arise under these facts. 
a. Once the questioning of Appellant exceeded the 
scope permitted in 77-7-15 and, in fact, focused on the only two 
elements of the crime, Miranda should have been given. The 
answers, (as non-probative as they were), were prompted by 
questioning. It is unlikely, from this record, that Appellant 
could have walked away unrestricted. 
b. Detention was undisputed once the Appellant was 
required to move to a different location and told to submit to 
field tests. Unless the state can argue that Appellant would 
have, but for the officer's prompting, walked to that location 
and voluntarily attempted to perform those acts, it cannot be 
derived that his freedom of movement was not| only altered but 
affirmatively scripted. 
Since the tests were designed to ellicit testimonial 
evidence of impairment and since the officer admitted that the 
tests were solely aimed at obtaining inculpatory evidence, the 
results thereof were obtained involuntarily fcnd in violation of 
Appellant's Fifth (and perhaps Fourth) Amendment rights. (See 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) holding that search 
for what is forbidden by Fifth Amendment is Unreasonable under 
the Fourth. 
5. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING 
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND/OR DISMISS 
The burden of proof in suppression hearings regarding 
warrantless searches/arrests is on the prosecpution. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Part IID). Had that burden 
been properly applied, Appellant's motion should have been 
granted. The court further abused its discretion in failing to 
dismiss the charge at the close of the state's case at trial for 
the reasons argued hereinbefore. 
6. SECTION 41-6-44(8) OF THE UTAH CODE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE OR A3 APPLIED 
As argued supra, the Utah arrest statute, absent 
exigent circumstances, prohibits a peace offi|cer, in misdemeanor 
situations, from making a warrantless arrest, (77-7-2.) 
The 1986 General Session of the Uta|h Legislature 
created a narrow exception to 77-7-2 by enact|ing 41-6-44(8); 
i.e., "probable cause" arrests for DUIs. 
This exception was enacted as a result of the Statewide 
Association of Prosecutorfs (SWAP) lobby which reacted to the 
dismissal of "hand-off" cases by trial courts in DUI prose-
cutions. The "hand-off" case is one where one police officer 
stopped a driver for suspected DUI then called a back-up officer 
to the scene to complete the processing and arrest; i.e., admin-
istering field sobriety tests, breath tests, etc. This procedure 
was primarily utilized due to the increased development of DUI 
"specialists" who could provide greater expertise and free up 
regular patrol officers for general duties. 
The "hand-off" from the patrol officer to the special-
ist, however, resulted in the specialist making an arrest follow-
ing the field tests (and other observations of impairment) but 
without having actually viewed the "driving" element of the crime 
being committed. I.e., the arresting officer was relying upon 
the probable cause formed by the hearsay of officer #1 that that 
officer had observed the driving (and that the driving pattern 
was of a nature to allow a legal stop of the suspect vehicle.) 
Since the strict application of 77-7-2 invalidated the 
arrest, the charges were dismissed and the DUI-specialist pro-
grams were being jeopardized. 
The arguments of prosecutors in those cases were the 
same as the SWAP lobbyists/proponents for 41-6-44(8); e.g., 
holdings of a goodly number of foreign state courts which de-
termined that in DUI cases the "police-team" concept should 
apply. The "police-team" concept is that an| ongoing crime may be 
witnessed by the collective "presence" of mojre than one officer 
in an unbroken episode and where the arresting officer witnesses 
the final element(s) of the crime and relies upon the fresh 
"hearsay" of the other officer(s) as to earlier element(s). SWAP 
also cited Utah case law (non-DUI) which arguably allowed the 
"police-team" theory to satisfy the "presence" requirement. 
(Citations omitted.) 
The common denominator in all "police team" cases; 
however, is that the hearsay is reliable because it comes from 
another police officer of known credibility Who is trained to 
make educated observations and is but another set of eyes for the 
team. 
Respondent will not argue that the reasoning of the 
successful SWAP lobbyists nor the committee Rebates went beyond 
"police-team" notions. 
In other words, neither the proponents of 41-6-44(8) 
nor the legislative framers intended untrained, biased citizens 
of unknown credibility to be included in the "police team". 
Further evidence of the legislative intent is found in 
the only two statutory exceptions (other tharti 41-6-44(8)) to the 
"presence" requirement of 77-7-2. 
In those two instances, a peace officer may make a 
probable cause arrest of a person who is suspected of shoplifting 
or library theft and has been contemporaneously detained by the 
merchant or library employee since the suspected offense and 
until the officer arrives. Those laws also grant civil and 
criminal immunity to the arrester. (See 77-6-801, et. seq. ; 
77-7-12 through 14, U.C.A.). 
None of the above statutes allow for a break in the 
series of events from viewing the offense, detention bv the 
citizen-viewer (merchant or library person) and the arrest by the 
responding officer. If the suspect has departed, the mer-
chant/library employee is no more than a complainant and the 
officer no longer has the authority to make a probable cause 
arrest. 
A. 41-6-44(8) was Unconstitutionally Applied to 
Appellant. 
Had the 1986 Utah legislature intended to create a 
vigilante force of DUI citizen-patrol officers it would have also 
created special legislation for detention and immunity as in the 
shoplifting and library theft exceptions. 
Even in those exceptions, the statutory probable cause 
is broken, and the officer cannot arrest thereon, where, as here, 
the suspect is not detained or continuously viewed. 
Deputy Russo perceived (and the state acquiesced to 
that belief) that 41-6-44(8) empowered him to make a post-crime 
warrantless arrest for an offense committed in the presence of a 
citizen. By application of that interpretation of the statute, 
the law empowers the "police-citizen-team" t}o substitute their 
judgment for that of an impartial magistrate which clearly 
violates the doctrine of the separation of powers and thereby 
deprives Appellant of the due process of judicial intervention. 
In the shopkeeper/librarian instance, the arresting 
officer can satisfy his probable cause concelrns by viewing a 
person who is still on the premises (scene oif the crime) with 
stolen merchandise on or near his person. H|e can also rely upon 
a person trained as a merchant or library person with particular 
knowledge of the stolen items. 
In the instant case, the officer must rely on an 
untrained citizen. (Note the pages of general testimony in the 
trial transcript as to the extensive training of the officers in 
DUI detection). He must also assume that th^ suspect was in the 
same state of impairment when seen driving. 
This officer has exceeded the intended application of 
the DUI probable cause arrest law and in so doing deprived 
Appellant of substantive due process rights in violation of state 
and federal guarantees. 
B. 41-6-44(8) is Unconstitutional on its Face. 
A statute is unconstitutionally vacjue if it gives 
unfettered discretion to the police as to making an arrest for 
its violation. Palmer v. City of Euclid, 4021 U.S. 544 (1971). 
41-6-44(8) allows police officers t|o make arrest 
without any restriction as to the source of tine hearsay-based 
probable cause or to the time constraints. Query: If citize 
"A" tells an officer that citizen "B" drove a vehicle while 
intoxicated "two months agoM, can the officer make an arrest? 
worse, can the officer wait another two months then arrest? 
statute (41-6-44(8)) allows unfettered discretion, unlike the 
limits enumerated in the library and shoplifting exceptions. 
officer may decide whether a magistrate's authority is necess 
or not. 
Further, the mere exception to "presence" in DUI ca 
is constitutionally suspect. Whenever due process is intrude 
upon, the issue of equal protection arises. To uphold such a 
exception to the warrant requirement, the court must weigh th 
due process rights of individuals against the needs of the st 
To pass constitutional muster the court must find the excepti 
to 77-7-2 to bear a "fair and substantial relationship to 
legitimate state ends". (See Michael M. v, Superior Court of 
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
It is clearly a legitimate state end to enforce DUI 
laws. Does DUI enforcement, however, rise to the level that the 
letter of the law allows for the only unrestricted "probable 
cause" arrest for a misdemeanor offense in Utah? The Utah Code 
classifies scores of misdemeanors as class "A" offenses, strictly 
defined as greater offenses than DUIs, (class "B"). Negligent 
homicide, assault on a police officer, child abuse, theft and a 












misdemeanors - yet none can be the subject of an unrestricted, 
non-presence, "probable cause" arrest. Only| DUI. 
Absent statutory language placing constraints upon the 
arresting officer's discretion as to facts, time and circum-
stances, 41-6-44(8) is unconstitutionally va|gue and its legitima-
cy weighs less than the due process rights i|t invades. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should find that the prp-arrest evidence 
obtained from Appellant was inadmissible in Whole or in part 
owing to the unlawful detention, questioning and arrest of 
Appellant and that there was insufficient prgbable cause for said 
arrest. 
Further the statute which gave the officer the authori-
ty to arrest Appellant on probable cause alo^e is unconstitution-
al on its face and as applied herein. 
This Court should reverse the convection below and 
remand this case back to the trial court for dismissal or such 
other relief consistent with the court's rul+ng. 
DATED this 0 day of January, l^p8. 
LONI F 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING z I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (\ day of January, 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with 
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Roger Blaylock, Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, 2001 South State, Room S3700, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84190-1200. 


























A About 11:00. 
Q What happened then? 
A Was eastbound on 45th South, traveling about 40 miles 
an hour, and I saw the defendant's pickup (truck in the emergency 
lane of 45th South, and it appeared, as I Was traveling, that it 
was not—he had stopped, and when I wals almost to him, he pulled 
over in_ front of me, from the emergency la^ e#._.crossed___both._lanes 
of traffic and went into the 7-Eleven, on the north side of the 
street. 
Q How fast were you traveling? 
A I would think 35, 40 miles an hour. 
Q What—how close were you to him, :>r to his vehicle 
when— 
A I was quite close, I—if he hadn't moved out of the 
emergency lane, I probably would have hit l^ ini. I locked my 
brakes and moved over into the emergency lane, to avoid colliding 
with^him, 
Q You then turned to the right as he went to the left? 
A Yes• Yes. 
Q What did you do after those incidents? 
A I was furious that this happened, and I turned my car 
around and pulled into the 7-Eleven parking lot and jumped out 
of my car and walked around, and asked him if he realized that 
he just about caused an accident, and h e — 
Q Now, is the individual that yousaw in that truck 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
49 
420 KEARNS BUH01NG 

























A I don't. I remember the kind of truck. 
Q What kind of truck was it? 
A It was a Plymouth Arrow, yellow, and I believe it had 
strikes on it. I'm thinking that they were black and red; but I 
do remember It's yellow. Plymouth Arrow. 
Q What did you do after these employees had attempted to 
call the police? 
A Well, they eventually got ahold of the police department, 
and I, knowing the area well,-decided that I would see if I could 
find him, and so we got back in the car and turned to 2900 East, 
going northbound and we traveled a couple of blocks, and I saw his 
pickup truck, parked at a corner house, just off 2900 East, 
Q Do you know what the address was there? 
A I believe that is La—a street called Lagoya, 
L-a-g-o-y-a, and their address would be on Lagoya, their house 
is facing Lagoya, and corners onto 2900 East. 
Q What happened then? 
A Well# we took down the address, and we went home. We 
have two-year-old twins and a babysitter, apd we went home and 
got our children, put them in the car—oh, We called the police 
from our home and told them the address, the exact address of 
where we had spotted the truck. And then after taking the 
babysitter home, went down to that address and the police were 
already there. 
25
 j Q What time was that? 
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A I would imagine around 11:20, 11:30. 
Q So, this whole sequence of events np to this point 
where you were there with the police took about how long, then? 
A I never spoke to the police. I was in the car with 
my children and—and my husband got out. Biit I was there--we 
were there probably a half hour, and finally, we left. The 
police were still there, but we left before^ It was close to 
midnight. 
Q I Okay. But apparently I didnft st^te that very well. 
But the time, how long had it taken since y<bu had first seen the 
car, when it pulled in front of you— 
A Uh huh. 
Q Until you were there at that address and the police 
had arrived? 
A Approximately 30 minutes. 
16
 Q About 30 minutes? 
17
 A Uh huh. 
18
 Q And then you were there another— 
19
 A Another 30 minutes, fas well. 
20
 Q — 3 0 minutes? 
21
 A At his address. 
22
 I Q And were there other people there at the time that you 
23
 arrived, besides the defendant? 
24
 I A At his home? 
Q Yes. 
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A .Uh huh. That's correct. 
Q And then you came and you taljked to him through the 
window of his vehicle; is that right? 
A I believe his window was down^ 
Q But you're not sure of it? 
A I could—no, not positive. 
Q And you observed that he was ctlassy-eyed? 
A Uh huh, yes. 
Q And unresponsive? 
A Right. 
Q And then the third thing is th^t he had difficulty 
leaving the lot, in that he drove into s<pme railroad ties? 
A Yes. He backed into— 
Q Did you make any—did you make any statements, written 
statements or reports or notes or anything of that— 
!6 I A No. I did not. 
17 Q I see* Did you tell the police officers that evening 
18
 that he drove into those railroad ties? 
19 A Yes—well# I can't say that, noi; because my husband 
20




 Q A l l r i g h t . So, you made no suc^i— 
2 3
 A No. No. 
24
 J Q —statement? 
A We—we did jot down his license plate number. 
1 
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A Yeah. We were going eastbound on 4 5th South and about 
29th East, saw a car parked off--looked maybe going five miles an 
hour, off in the right-hand lane. We were going eastbound, 
thought nothing of it, all of a sudden, he pulled out going into 
a 7-Eleven. My wife had to lock the brakes, we came within about 
two feet of hitting him broadside. I, at that time--we—it made 
us so mad, because we had to lock the brakes, we pulled in right 
next to him, we pulled in on his left. I got out, saying what 
are you trying to do, cause an accident. 
Q Yeah. If you'd sit and then I'll ask you questions and 
you can respond to questions. 
A Okay. 
13




 A Did not really respond, just kihd of a mumbled voice. 
16
 Q What happened then? 
1? A Well, we got out/ he had a little yellow pickup truck, 
18 i noticed in the back of his pickup truck two six-packs that were 
19 
20 
empty, as well as what *pr^ r^*!fL-*"^  ^ ° a uyhiQk^Y fro***"1** that was 
ahouthalf empty. 
21
 I Q What happened then? 
22
 A At which time, I asked him, I said, ajre you drunk? 
23
 J Q Did he respond to that? 
A He did not respond. He was kind of glassy-eyed, 24 
25 saying, a-h-h-h-h. At which time, I sa id , I'm going to c a l l the 
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you observe him"do? 
A Okay. At which time, he—all ^he cars were parked bt 
7-Eleven, at which time, he backed up in kind of a 90-degree 
angle backing up, hit the retaining wall> which is one of thes^ 
railroad tie things, with his back bumpe^. At which time, he 
took off at a fast rate of speed, looked Like he was about to 
drop the transmission the way he pulled cfut, out onto 4 5th South, 
did not even observe to see if there was any traffic coming/down 
the hill. 
Q Now, you say he didn't observe to see if there was any 
traffic? 
A He just pulled straight out, no stop whatsoever. 
Q Any hesitation before he pulled onto the road? 
A Nothing. 
Q What did you then do? 
A At which time, I was in 7-Eleveii, my wife was outside, 
I said, better call the sheriff. He took Dff—as I said, he 
took off, the 7-Eleven guy had to pull soiree card out to have the 
phone work, called the sheriff, my wife was outside noticing— 
trying to find out where he took off to. At which time, he went 
down the street right below, which is 29th| East, took off going 
22
 | north. 
2
^ I At which time, my wife and I both got in the car, we 
24
 were driving along 29th East, though, hey, maybe we'll find 
[ something, but you know, not really anticipating finding anything, 
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earlier observed driving the vehicle? 
Yes. The sheriff asked me, saying, well, there's a 
as to who was dri— 
Well — 
MR. DeLAND: I'll o b — 
(By Mr. Blaylock) —don't say what hie said; what did 
the sheriff? 
I said, yeah, I says, the guy's right back near the 
/hich was the— 
Did you point out who you meant? 
Yes. I said it's that guy right near the garage. 
garage to the front property line is probably 40, 50 













Was there any question in your mind as to who— 
No question. Absolutely no question. 
What did you then do? 
I told the sheriff, I said, it's that guy right over 
After you'd explained that— 
Yes. 
—you pointed out the individual!? 
Yes. 
Did you do anything further? 
He said, can you— 
No. Did you do anything further? | 
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night, and he stated no, he hadn't been. We asked him if—who 
else had, and he stated that one of the other guys had been 
out driving, had been to the 7-Eleven. 
Q And did the individual that they pointed out as being 
the "other guy" , was that the defendant?] 
A That was the defendant, yes. 
Q What happened then? 
A At that time, Deputy Russo mor^ or ] ess took over the— 
you know, asked him questions, we started talking with the others. 
Another deputy had arrived in that time, too, and so we just more 
or less was talking to the others, gettihg information from them. 
Deputy Russo started talking to him, asking—I guess asking him 
13 if he'd been drinking and that, 
14
 Q Did—do you know the two individuals that testified just 
15
 previously? 
" A I — 
17
 Q Have you seen thegL fogfnrg? 
18 A Okay. I was told who they were, and they drove up in 
19
 a car later on, and I didn't—didnft get that good of a glance 
20 at them, no, 
21
 Q I see, 
22 A But I know who they are, now. 
23 J Q I see. You did see them then later at that location? 
A Yes. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I'd have no further questions. 
1 1 i . • i ' ' ' i 
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1 MR. DeLAND: I have no questions. No questions, your 
2 Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Would you wait outside, sir? 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
5 MR. BLAYLOCK: May he be excused? 
6 MR. DeLAND: I have no objection. 
7 THE COURT: You may be excused, sir. 
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Hqnor. 
9 E. ROBBIE RUS^O, 
10 called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this matter, 
11 after having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
12 as follows: 
13 THE COURT: Take the stand, sir. 
14 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. BLAYLOCK: 
16 Q What is your name? 
17 A E. Robbie Russo. 
18 Q How are you employed? 
19 A Deputy Sheriff, Salt Lake County. 
20 Q How long have you been with the Sheriff's department? 
21 A About two-and-a-half years. 
22 Q Were you working for the sheriff's department 
23 October 4th last year? 
24 A Yes. I was. 
25 Q / About 11:30, sometime after 11:00, did you receive a 
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call about a possible drunk driver? 
A Yes, sir. I did. 
Q And what did you do when you received that call? 
A I responded to the initial scene <t>f occurrence, which" 
was 2931 East 4 4 33 South. , -— —-—"--""' 
Q And what's located at that address? 
A There's a 7-Eleven convenience store at that address. 
Q 2931 East 4430 South? 
A Yes. It's right on 4500 South, btit the actual 
address is 4430. 
11 Q Did you receive any further updates or information? 
12 A Yes. I did. 
13 Q And what was that? 
14 A The suspect vehicle that was described apparently had 
15 been stopped by Deputy Orton at another addjress that was close 
16 by. 
17
 Q Did you respond then to a different address? 
18 A Yes. I did. 
1 9
 Q What was that? 
2 0
 J ( A That address is 2889 Lajoya. 
2 1
 Q How i s t h a t spe l l ed? 
2 2
 A I b e l i e v e i t ' s L - a - c a p i t a l J -o-y-&. 
2 3
 Q Did you then go to t h a t a rea? 
2 4
 A Yes, s i r . I d id . 
2 5
 Q What d id you find a t t h a t a rea? 
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A I found the suspect vehicle parked at that address, 
with some individuals, outside. 
Q And by the suspect vehicle, would you describe that 
vehicle? 
A The vehicle is a 1980 yellow Plymouth pickup truck. 
Do you want the license number? 
Q Yeah. What was the license number? 
A LF 4837. 
And where did you get that license number? 
That was given by the original complainant. 
I mean where did you receive it^ 





Q Where did you get the license number; was that given to 
fbu by dispatch? 
A Yes. It was. 
Q Or was that given to you by another deputy or— 
\ v A It was given over the air, by dispatch. 
Q —over the air? Who had the primary responsibility for 
this investigation? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You did? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. What did you do then after you arrived at that 
area and saw the vehicle? 
(A I asked whose vehicle it was an an individual stepped) 
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Q Was that person ever identified to you? 
A Yes. He was. 
Q As who? 
A As Brian Scoffield. 
Q What did he say to you? 
A He told me that he was driving ^he truck. 
Q What did you do after he said he was driving the truck? 
A Asked him to present his identification and began to 
interview him. 
Q Now, was the defendant there at that time? 
A Yes, he was. 
Q Where was he in relationship to Mr. Scoffield? 
A He was— 
Q Was he close or far away? 
A He was standing about halfway in the—halfway back in 
the driveway. 
Q About how many feet away was he^ 
A Oh, about 20 feet. 
Q Was he in a position where he could hear what you asked, 
who was driving? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Did he respond to that question at all? 
A No. 
Q Now, you asked Mr. Scof f ie ld foi: h i s I .D . and o t h e r 
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i n f o r m a t i o n ? 
A Yes , s i r . 
Q What happened then? 
A The original complainant pulled up and identified 
himself to me. 
Q And who was that? 
A Roger Mott. 
Q Has he already testified today? Have you seen him 
earlier today? 
A I've seen him in the courtroom, yes, 
Q What did he tell you? 
A He told me that he and his wife*—he gave me an 
explanation of what had transpired and why he had called, but then 
he came up and he said, you have the wron^ person who was driving 
the car, and he pointed out the defendant4 
16 I Q And he pointed at the defendant^ 
17 A Yes* 
18 Q And the individual that he identified, is that person 
19 present in the courtroom today? 
20 A Yes, he is. He's seated at the defendant's table with 
21 the dark hair and light colored suit. 
22 MR. BLAYLOCK: May the record show the identification 
23 of the defendant, your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: It will. 
25 MR. BLAYLOCK: Thank you. 
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Q (By Mr. Blaylock) Did you havd any conversation with 
Mr. Scof field then, as a result of what he's previously told 
you? 
A No. The other officer spoke with him, and my attention 
was drawn towards the defendant. 
Q What did you then do? 
A Asked the defendant for his identification. 
Q Did he present it? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was the name? 
A Brady C. Bullock, it was a California driver_^_JjLoense. 
Q Did you notice anything about him as you were 
conversing with him? 
A Yes. I did_. 
Q What? 
A That I could detect a moderate 0dor of alcohol about 
his person. 
Q And when you pulled up, you indicated that there were 
people standing around there; do you know approximately how many? 
A It would be a guess, I couldn't say for sure how many 
other people were there. I—it's—I donft} remember. 
Q Did you observe any of them to t^ ave beer or alcohol or 
any kind? 
A None that I recall. 
Q Is that something that you would have observed? 
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Q Did you observe whether Mr. Bullock, the defendant, 
had any beer or alcohol at the time you arrived? 
A No, 
Q Now, when did you--do you recall when you first 
received the message frpnjjAisjg^atch? _____ 
/ A It was approximately at 2350, which .is_ ten minutes to 
/i midnight. 
Q And is that when you arrived or when you received the 
call? 
A We had actually received two different calls. 
Q I see. 
A So, I was already in the area when we got the second 
call and the other deputy found the suspect vehicle. 
Q The call at 2350, was that the first or the second 
call? 
A I believe that's the first call that I have listed. 
Q Okay, How long did it take you to respond, do you 
have any idea? 
A Yes. Because I was already at the 7-Eleven, this 
LaJoya is only a couple blocks away, so it was just a minute. 
Q Fairly close, there? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Now, you asked Mr. Bullock for his I.D. What did you 
do then? 
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A I had asked him if he had been drinking and in fact 












Q How did he respond? 
A He told me that he had had just three beers and that 
5 yes, he was driving the truck,. 
r Q What did you do then? 
7 A Asked him to submit—or perform some field sobriety 
Q i tests, 
g I Q What's a field sobriety tests^ f 
10 | A They're a group of standardized tests that individuals 
11 J perform to determine their level of impairment, if any. 
Q Have you had any training with regards to driving under 
the influence cases? 
A Yes. I have. 
5^ Q What training is that? 
A You receive a standardized set of training from the 
17 Police Officers Standards and Training in initial academy; 
however, I — 
Q How many hours is that, do you recall? 
20 A I don't recall exactly how many were involved in that. 
Q For a few days? A week? Don't have any idea? 
A I couldnft say. 
Q All right. 
A I have, since, taken other further classes and for 
25 certification of intoxilyzer testing and recertification and one 
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Q What was your opinion? 
A My opinion was that he was impaired. 
Q Now, by impaired, do you mean that he was falling-down 
drunk? 
A No, sir. 
Q What would be your—what's the difference between 
impairment and falling-down drunk, as youl understand it? 
A An impairment would be someone Kho is rendered 
incapable of safely—in this case, safely1 driving a motor 
vehicle, A drunk, you have the typical sfLoppy drunk who falls 
down; that's a higher level or degree of intoxication, 
Q By impaired, how would that relate to his ability to 
operate a motor vehicle? 
A He would not be able to do so safely. 
Q After the field sobriety tests, what did you do? 
A Advised him that I believedheWas impaired and I was 
placing him under arrest for driving underf the influence of 
18 alcohol. 
19 Q What action did you then take? 
20 A I asked him if he would—was willing to submit to a 
21 chemical test to determine the blood alcohol content of his 
22 breath. 
23 Q what did he say? 
24 A He submitted to it, 
25 Q So, what did you do, as far as that procedure? 
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A I gave a copy of the results tcj> the defendant and then 
I kept the rest and placed it into evidence. 
Q Now, was the result that you obtained consistent with 
your visual observations of the defendant^? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have anything fufther, after placing these 
items into evidence, did you do anything further? 
A I transported the defendant to jail at that point. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I'd have no furtlher questions of this 
witness. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DeLAND: 
Q Deputy Russo, it's a little unusual, isn't it, that 
you drive into a residential neighborhood and pull up and ask 
somebody to do these field tests in a driveway? 
16
 I A Yes. 
1? Q Typically, on a drunk driving arrest, what you do is 
18 J you either have an accident you're investigating or you make 
observation of a driving pattern and you piake a stop? 
20
 I A Yes, sir. That's correct. 
21 Q And so in this case, what you were doing, you were 
substituting the judgment of civilian witnesses for that of an 
23 J officer for a driving pattern; isn't that right? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
Q Because you didn't have an accident; 
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A That's correct. 
Q And so your decision to ask my client to take the 
field tests and so forth, you relied on the credibility of those 
witnesses, didn't you? 
A Partially. And my observation^. 
Q After you got there; but you wouldn't have been there 
without the credibility of those witnesses playing a part, would 
you? 
A No. 
Q Because you never saw my clientl drive the vehicle? 
^ _ 
That's correct. 
Q And as a matter of fact, the observations you made 
about sobriety or lack thereof, were base4 upon the short period 
of time after any actual driving may have taken place; isn't that 
right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, you—you took training, you^ve told us, on more 
than one occasion, in identifying the drinking driver? 
A Yes. 
Q And part of that training, is it not, to learn about 
the cumulative effects of alcohol on the sybtem, on a driver? 
A Yes. 
Q And so you know that if I sat her^ and I drank three 
beers, the first little while, I'd seem prettty normal, wouldn't I? 
The first few minutes? 
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1 I A Yes. 
2 1 Q Later on, that would make my b|Lood alcohol level rise 
3 and I might start reaching the level of impairment; isn't that 
4 true? 
5 A That's correct. 
6 Q Okay, And so when you observe a person after having 
7 consumed an amount of alcohol sufficient to impair them, it's 
8 important as to when, in relation to when| they drank that alcohol 
9 that you make that observation, isn't it? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q You—did you receive any recorded or written statement 
12 from the Motts, either of them? 
13 A No. 
14
 Q I think you spoke primarily witl^ Mr. Mott, didn't you? 
15
 A That's correct. 
16 Q And I take it you put everything in your report that 
17 they told you? 
18 A A summation. 
19 Q In substance. And essentially, ^hey indicated that 
20 my client, personally identified as my client, pulled out in 
21 front of them; j^that right? 
22 A That's correct, 
23 Q Pulled into a 7-Eleven? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q And t h e y were q u i t e angry a b o u t tjhat? 
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• • " - 1 — : / • • — — 
They were that and visually sl)ak--or yeah, shaken. 
-—-——_____ - - "~-
Yeah. Did Mr. Tlott tell you dbout a bottle of whiskey 
In the vehicle, o r — 
Yeah. 
—on-/no. / 
Did he tell you about a couple of six packs of beer 
A /No, 
Q You only, when you asked my client to take a breath 
test, you only had him take one test, didn't you? 
A That's correct. 
Q And when you asked him to take the field tests, you 
asked him to take them out there in the dfriveway of this home 
on LaJoya? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you know that driveway of that home on LaJoya is 
not level, it's sloped, isn't it? 
A Part of it, that's why I v/ent oijit to the bottom where 
it was flat. 
Q Are you saying it's not sloped On the bottom? 
A Pardon me? 
Q Are you saying it's not sloped? 
A I found a—I wanted—he was—he pame up and he talked 
to me at the street. In all fairness, I took him to a flat, 
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a l s o , and t h a t was t o Mr. S c o f f i e l d , werje you d r i v i n g t h a t e v e n i n g , 
words t o t h a t e f f e c t ? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. He said yes, he wa^? 
A He said he was--he was driving it, yes. 
Q Prior to him taking these fiel4 tests, my client, the 
field sobriety tests where he's walking around in the driveway, 
you had basically what these witnesses haft told you? 
A That's right. 
Q And what my client had—you'd swelled his breath and 
he'd answered a couple of questions for y0u; right? 
A Correct. 
Q You asked him to do t h e s e f i e l d t jests? 
A Yes . 
Q Did you advise him of his right to remain silent, his 
right to have counsel present, any of thos^ things, before you 
had him take those tests? 
A I was still conducting an investigation, so I did not. 
Q\ Soy he was not told that he had c^  right not to take 
f hose^tp^t"^ i v a s hr?— 
A No. 
Q He's not—there's no requirement |Jiat he takes those 
tests, are there? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, could vfe approach the bench? 
THE COURT: You may. 
K 
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(Whereupon, an off-the-record d|iscussion was held at 
side bar.) 
Q (By Mr. DeLand) I don't recall if you answered the 
last question. The question was, there's no requirement that a 
person take your field sobriety tests, is there? 
A No, sir. 
Q And in fact what you were doing was, you'd gathered 
evidence that you've now told the jury abolut, by taking those 












11 Q Did you s e a r c h t h e t r u s t a f t e r tfce a r r e s t ? 
12 A I d i d n o t , n o , 
13
 Q Do you know who did? 
14
 J A I believe it was Deputy Orton, 
Q Okay. There's no—there's no evidence, there's nothing 
that's been placed in the evidence room', was there? 
17
 A No. 
18
 Q Nothing unusual about the truck? 
19
 A No. 
20
 Q There was no damage to the truck, was there? 
21
 A I told you I didn't check it. 
22
 Q Well, do you know from any of the reports? 
23
 J A None. None listed on my report, no. 
Q And you've told us now, you've tol£ the jury that in 
your opinion, at the time you saw my client, he was impaired; is 
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